California v. Texas No. 19–840. Argued November 10, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...9-840_6jfm.pdf
http://christian-identity.net/forum/...3046#post23046
http://whitenationalist.org/forum/sh...3046#post23046
No. 19–840. Argued November 10, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021*
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as enacted in 2010 required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance
coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who
failed to do so. Amendments to the Act in 2017 effectively nullified the
penalty by setting its amount to $0. Subsequently, Texas (along with
over a dozen States and two individuals) brought suit against federal
officials, claiming that without the penalty the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, codified at 26 U. S. C. §5000A(a), is unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the provision is unconstitutional, a finding that the rest of the Act is not severable from
§5000A(a), and an injunction against enforcement of the rest of the
Act. The District Court determined that the individual plaintiffs had
standing. It also found §5000A(a) both unconstitutional and not severable from the rest of the Act. The Fifth Circuit agreed as to the existence of standing and the unconstitutionality of §5000A(a), but concluded that the District Court’s severability analysis provided
insufficient justification to strike down the entire Act. Petitioner California and other States intervened to defend the Act’s constitutionality and to seek further review.
Held: Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge §5000A(a)’s minimum
essential coverage provision because they have not shown a past or
future injury fairly traceable to defendants’ conduct enforcing the specific statutory provision they attack as unconstitutional. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The Constitution gives federal courts the power to adjudicate
only genuine “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. To have standing, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342.
No plaintiff has shown such an injury “fairly traceable” to the “allegedly unlawful conduct” challenged here. Pp. 4–5.
(b) The two individual plaintiffs claim a particularized individual
harm in the form of past and future payments necessary to carry the
minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires. Assuming this
pocketbook injury satisfies the injury element of Article III standing,
it is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which
the plaintiffs complain, Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. Without a
penalty for noncompliance, §5000A(a) is unenforceable. The individuals have not shown that any kind of Government action or conduct has
caused or will cause the injury they attribute to §5000A(a). The
Court’s cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury
that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement,
whether today or in the future. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 298. Here, there is only the statute’s textually unenforceable language.
Unenforceable statutory language alone is not sufficient to establish
standing, as the redressability requirement makes clear. Whether an
injury is redressable depends on the relationship between “the judicial
relief requested” and the “injury” suffered. Allen, 468 U. S. at 753, n.
19. The only relief sought regarding the minimum essential coverage
provision is declaratory relief, namely, a judicial statement that the
provision challenged is unconstitutional. But just like suits for every
other type of remedy, declaratory-judgment actions must satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. See MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126–127. Article III standing requires
identification of a remedy that will redress the individual plaintiffs’
injuries. Id., at 127. No such remedy exists here. To find standing to
attack an unenforceable statutory provision would allow a federal
court to issue what would amount to an advisory opinion without the
possibility of an Article III remedy. Article III guards against federal
courts assuming this kind of jurisdiction. See Carney v. Adams, 592
U. S. ___, ___ . The Court also declines to consider Federal respondents’ novel alternative theory of standing first raised in its merits brief
on behalf the individuals, as well as the dissent’s novel theory on behalf of the states, neither of which was directly argued by plaintiffs
below nor presented at the certiorari stage. Pp. 5–10.
(c) Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to show
that the pocketbook injuries they allege are traceable to the Government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3
Syllabus
547 U. S. 332, 342. They allege two forms of injury: one indirect, one
direct.
(1) The state plaintiffs allege indirect injury in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs. They
say the minimum essential coverage provision has caused more state
residents to enroll in the programs. The States, like the individual
plaintiffs, have failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to
the Government’s actual or possible action in enforcing §5000A(a), so
they lack Article III standing as a matter of law. But the States have
also not shown that the challenged minimum essential coverage provision, without any prospect of penalty, will injure them by leading more
individuals to enroll in these programs. Where a standing theory rests
on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (here
an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the
plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in
predictable ways.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S.
___, ___. Neither logic nor evidence suggests that an unenforceable
mandate will cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. It would require far stronger
evidence than the States have offered here to support their counterintuitive theory of standing, which rests on a “highly attenuated chain
of possibilities.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 410–411.
Pp. 11–14.
(2) The state plaintiffs also claim a direct injury resulting from a
variety of increased administrative and related expenses allegedly required by §5000A(a)’s minimum essential coverage provision. But
other provisions of the Act, not the minimum essential coverage provision, impose these requirements. These provisions are enforced without reference to §5000A(a). See 26 U. S. C. §§6055, 6056. A conclusion
that the minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional
would not show that enforcement of these other provisions violates the
Constitution. The other asserted pocketbook injuries related to the Act
are similarly the result of enforcement of provisions of the Act that
operate independently of §5000A(a). No one claims these other provisions violate the Constitution. The Government’s conduct in question
is therefore not “fairly traceable” to enforcement of the “allegedly unlawful” provision of which the plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a). Allen,
468 U. S., at 751. Pp. 14–16.
945 F. 3d. 355, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Opinion 52 pages:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...9-840_6jfm.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...9-840_6jfm.pdf
http://christian-identity.net/forum/...3046#post23046
http://whitenationalist.org/forum/sh...3046#post23046
No. 19–840. Argued November 10, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021*
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as enacted in 2010 required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance
coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who
failed to do so. Amendments to the Act in 2017 effectively nullified the
penalty by setting its amount to $0. Subsequently, Texas (along with
over a dozen States and two individuals) brought suit against federal
officials, claiming that without the penalty the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, codified at 26 U. S. C. §5000A(a), is unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the provision is unconstitutional, a finding that the rest of the Act is not severable from
§5000A(a), and an injunction against enforcement of the rest of the
Act. The District Court determined that the individual plaintiffs had
standing. It also found §5000A(a) both unconstitutional and not severable from the rest of the Act. The Fifth Circuit agreed as to the existence of standing and the unconstitutionality of §5000A(a), but concluded that the District Court’s severability analysis provided
insufficient justification to strike down the entire Act. Petitioner California and other States intervened to defend the Act’s constitutionality and to seek further review.
Held: Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge §5000A(a)’s minimum
essential coverage provision because they have not shown a past or
future injury fairly traceable to defendants’ conduct enforcing the specific statutory provision they attack as unconstitutional. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The Constitution gives federal courts the power to adjudicate
only genuine “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. To have standing, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342.
No plaintiff has shown such an injury “fairly traceable” to the “allegedly unlawful conduct” challenged here. Pp. 4–5.
(b) The two individual plaintiffs claim a particularized individual
harm in the form of past and future payments necessary to carry the
minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires. Assuming this
pocketbook injury satisfies the injury element of Article III standing,
it is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which
the plaintiffs complain, Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. Without a
penalty for noncompliance, §5000A(a) is unenforceable. The individuals have not shown that any kind of Government action or conduct has
caused or will cause the injury they attribute to §5000A(a). The
Court’s cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury
that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement,
whether today or in the future. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 298. Here, there is only the statute’s textually unenforceable language.
Unenforceable statutory language alone is not sufficient to establish
standing, as the redressability requirement makes clear. Whether an
injury is redressable depends on the relationship between “the judicial
relief requested” and the “injury” suffered. Allen, 468 U. S. at 753, n.
19. The only relief sought regarding the minimum essential coverage
provision is declaratory relief, namely, a judicial statement that the
provision challenged is unconstitutional. But just like suits for every
other type of remedy, declaratory-judgment actions must satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. See MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126–127. Article III standing requires
identification of a remedy that will redress the individual plaintiffs’
injuries. Id., at 127. No such remedy exists here. To find standing to
attack an unenforceable statutory provision would allow a federal
court to issue what would amount to an advisory opinion without the
possibility of an Article III remedy. Article III guards against federal
courts assuming this kind of jurisdiction. See Carney v. Adams, 592
U. S. ___, ___ . The Court also declines to consider Federal respondents’ novel alternative theory of standing first raised in its merits brief
on behalf the individuals, as well as the dissent’s novel theory on behalf of the states, neither of which was directly argued by plaintiffs
below nor presented at the certiorari stage. Pp. 5–10.
(c) Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to show
that the pocketbook injuries they allege are traceable to the Government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3
Syllabus
547 U. S. 332, 342. They allege two forms of injury: one indirect, one
direct.
(1) The state plaintiffs allege indirect injury in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs. They
say the minimum essential coverage provision has caused more state
residents to enroll in the programs. The States, like the individual
plaintiffs, have failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to
the Government’s actual or possible action in enforcing §5000A(a), so
they lack Article III standing as a matter of law. But the States have
also not shown that the challenged minimum essential coverage provision, without any prospect of penalty, will injure them by leading more
individuals to enroll in these programs. Where a standing theory rests
on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (here
an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the
plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in
predictable ways.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S.
___, ___. Neither logic nor evidence suggests that an unenforceable
mandate will cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. It would require far stronger
evidence than the States have offered here to support their counterintuitive theory of standing, which rests on a “highly attenuated chain
of possibilities.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 410–411.
Pp. 11–14.
(2) The state plaintiffs also claim a direct injury resulting from a
variety of increased administrative and related expenses allegedly required by §5000A(a)’s minimum essential coverage provision. But
other provisions of the Act, not the minimum essential coverage provision, impose these requirements. These provisions are enforced without reference to §5000A(a). See 26 U. S. C. §§6055, 6056. A conclusion
that the minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional
would not show that enforcement of these other provisions violates the
Constitution. The other asserted pocketbook injuries related to the Act
are similarly the result of enforcement of provisions of the Act that
operate independently of §5000A(a). No one claims these other provisions violate the Constitution. The Government’s conduct in question
is therefore not “fairly traceable” to enforcement of the “allegedly unlawful” provision of which the plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a). Allen,
468 U. S., at 751. Pp. 14–16.
945 F. 3d. 355, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Opinion 52 pages:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...9-840_6jfm.pdf
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